Abstract-Resilience has recently emerged as a security priority, but the development of mission resilience analysis techniques for military systems has lagged behind those for other systems. This paper identifies gaps for mission resilience assessment in current vulnerability assessment approaches used at military facilities. Additionally, the paper describes ongoing research to develop a set of mission resilience models that addresses those gaps and could be used to evaluate mission resilience to electric power outages.
I. INTRODUCTION
The events of September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina, and other incidents of national significance have caused a strategic shift in U.S. national and homeland security policies over the last decade. Policymakers have come to realize that one cannot protect all assets at all times from all threats. Hence, national security strategies have included resilience as a priority to complement protection activities. However, a key challenge in transforming resilience into an operational concept is a lack of suitable resilience assessment methodologies for military systems.
This paper describes ongoing research efforts at Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) to develop a new modeling capability that can be used to assess the resilience of military missions to infrastructure disruptions. In the first section, current military vulnerability assessment methods are briefly reviewed and limitations for assessing mission resilience are identified. The next section describes research to develop modeling tools that can be used to assess the resilience of missions to power outages. The paper concludes with a discussion on how the modeling capabilities to be expanded to non-military systems and other types of infrastructure disruptions.
II. CURRENT METHODS Though Holling [1] is generally credited with providing the first systems definition of resilience more than four decades ago, the field of infrastructure resilience is in its relative infancy. Little agreement exists on definitions and assessment methods. Other than mental health assessments for soldiers, no commonly accepted resilience analysis methods exist for military systems.
Infrastructure evaluations for military systems are typically performed via a number of vulnerability assessment methods. For example, the Department of Defense (DoD) Antiterrorism/Force Protection program uses the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) to perform vulnerability assessments. JSIVA reviews typically focus on individual sites, physical security, and response to terrorist events [2] . The JSIVA approach generally either does not consider mission dependencies on civilian infrastructure systems or only considers "one link" beyond the facility perimeter. The JSIVA approach may consider mission relationships and metrics but only considers civilian CIKRs in a limited fashion. This limitation can hamper the ability to identify key vulnerabilities that, if exploited, could affect the ability to carry out a mission.
The Department of Navy (DON) has developed the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Self Assessment Tool (SAT) for critical naval assets. This tool enables installation commanders and other staff to perform their own Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) self-assessment. This tool presents a series of questions aimed at "identifying vulnerabilities that could jeopardize the execution of Mission Essential Tasks" [3] . Similar to the JSIVA methodology, the SAT appears to be focused on the execution of a single mission at a single asset 1 . Sandia has developed several risk assessment approaches, including the Risk Assessment Methodology (RAM) [4] , Systems Effectiveness Assessment (SEA) [5] , and Total Risk Assessment Methodology [6] , that are capable of considering dependencies on civilian CIKR systems. Typically, though, the primary objective of their application to DoD facilities and civilian CIKR systems is to improve protection and decrease vulnerabilities; hence, they tend to provide a static analysis and do not consider what recovery actions must take place to carry out a mission in the event of a successful attack.
These vulnerability and risk assessment approaches all provide important information contributing to the mission assurance and security at military installations, but they each have shortcomings in the context of resilience assessment, as previously noted. The authors assert that the following requirements can be used as a basis for the expansion of risk and VA methods into comprehensive mission resilience assessment methods for infrastructure disruptions: 3) Mission resilience assessment methods must consider dynamic recovery processes: Reliance on protection principles is not sufficient for comprehensive resilience assessment. The evaluation of mission resilience must consider the possibility that disruptions, whether malevolent or accidental in nature, will occur and affect the supply of energy to military facilities. The extent to which the missions are prepared for disruptions and the rapidity, effectiveness, and affordability of recovery steps must be considered.
The authors assert that the development of formal mission resilience assessment methods that include these requirements will:
1) Provide objective evaluations of the current state of infrastructure resilience for a facility or set of facilities; 2) Provide a means for identifying potential infrastructure vulnerabilities at a facility or set of facilities; and 3) Enable the evaluation of modifications designed to improve the mission resilience of a facility or set of facilities.
III. MISSION RESILIENCE MODELING Researchers at Sandia have recently begun investigating the development of mission resilience modeling tools. Initial efforts have focused on the development of models that evaluate a mission's resilience to electric power disruptions. Specifically, researchers are trying to address the following question: if a disruptive event occurs that decreases or halts the delivery of power to a military facility, how resilient are the missions conducted at that facility and mission-related facilities to the power disruption? This section describes those recent modeling efforts.
The Sandia researchers decompose the mission resilience problem into two primary subcomponents:
• The supply system: bulk power systems generate and transmit electric power to utility customers.
• The demand system: for the problem under consideration, military facilities and their power requirements represent the demand systems. The following general scenario describes the problem under consideration.
It is assumed that a disruptive event, e.g., a hurricane, occurs that physically compromises the functionality of several components of a bulk power system. These components could be generators, transmission lines, substations, transformers, or other equipment contributing to the overall performance of the bulk power system. It is assumed that multiple components are compromised.
The initial physical insult can lead to cascading failures that affect the functionality. Tripped circuits and line failures are cascading failure examples. This equipment damage is indirectly caused by the initiating event, and complete restoration of the bulk power system cannot occur until these failures are repaired.
Upon recognition of the disruption, the utility may take actions to limit the cascading failures. Grid separation, or islanding, is an example of a proactive measure that a utility might take. Load shedding, i.e., purposefully reducing power delivery to certain loads, is another example. Other mitigation responses may be automated. The result of these actions is that the system is stabilized and further system damage is prevented.
The utility transitions from "stabilize" to repair mode. Repair crews are sent out to assess damage and to initiate repairs. Equipment must be repaired and then re-energized to restore functionality. Prior to the disruption, utilities generally identify priority loads. Restoration sequences for loads are typically determined by priorities and resource constraints.
Meanwhile, the impact of the disruption is that some loads or "customers" that are connected to the bulk power system will receive reduced amounts or no power. In this paper it is assumed that at least one of the disrupted loads is a military facility, which supports an underlying set of missions through the execution of particular tasks, utilizing a set of assets (typically, but not necessarily exclusively buildings), which rely on electric power and other elements of critical infrastructure. This logic, while applied to a military functional structure, could easily be transposed into other public and private sector mission spaces where well-identified functionality and responsibility can be identified.
When a military facility loses power as a result of the disruption, CAPs are enacted as necessary. CAPs are typically more resource intensive, less reliable, or cannot be executed as quickly as normal operations (if they were, they would be the status quo). For example, if the ability to communicate with weather condition and forecasting facilities is lost, flight operations can be continued using visual assessment of weather conditions. This alternative practice comes with increased safety risk and decreased accuracy and efficiency. The most common CAPs for loss of supply of commercial electric power would include alternate, temporary sources of power. Some buildings may have uninterrupted power supply (UPS) batteries or backup diesel generators to limit the impacts of the power outage, servicing all or portions of load for the facility. In other cases, these mitigating options will not be in place.
During the power outage, mission execution is likely decreased or compromised at the military facility. As the outage continues, the likelihood of successful mission execution is expected to become increasingly compromised.
Critical tasks contributing to a single mission may be executed at geographically disconnected sites. In these instances, sites unaffected by the power outage may increase their activities to compensate for decreased mission execution at the facilities in the power outage. If the power outage continues long enough, mission materials, manpower, and equipment may be relocated to the alternative, unaffected sites to complete mission tasks.
Mission operations typically return to normal when facility commanders are assured and confident that reliable power delivery has been restored. The severity of the disruption, resource availability, and preparedness (for the power utility and military base) ultimately determine the severity and length of mission impacts.
To simulate this scenario, Sandia researchers have developed two separate but connected models. The first model simulates the initial disruptive event's impact on an electric power utility and the ensuing recovery activities that the utility takes to restore power. This model provides power outage magnitude and duration parameters to a mission hierarchy model. For the specified power outage parameters, the mission hierarchy model estimates impacts to mission functionality at a military base within the power outage region. The mission hierarchy model represents multiple missions executed at the site, and it includes mission connections to other military sites not necessarily affected by the power outage. The following sections describe these two models.
A. Resilience Modeling for Bulk Power Systems
Sandia researchers have developed a model that can be used to analyze the resilience of bulk power systems. For a specified scenario and power system, the model can estimate the length of the disruption, costs associated with decreased load, recovery costs, and dynamic load restoration.
The numerical model consists of three primary modules. The system description module allows the modeler to define the bulk power system and disruption details. The sequencing module determines the order in which components will be repaired and reenergized. The results module reports scenarios statistics that characterize the resilience of the system. The first step in the system description module is the loading of an existing PowerWorld system model. PowerWorld is a commercially available power flow simulation software that calculates static power flows across a designated configuration [7] . A PowerWorld system model includes description of the network topology, i.e., system components, their capacities, and connections between the components. When the system model is loaded, the user interface lists all of the system components (generators, lines, buses, and loads). The modeler then establishes the damage state by selecting components and specifying there damage state as "High," "Medium," or "Low." The modeler also assigns restoration priority for each damaged component. That is, if N components are specified as damaged, each component is assigned an integer value from 1 to N, with 1 indicating the highest priority and increasing priority numbers indicating decreasing priority.
For each component/damage state combination, the system description module has a pre-defined set of repair information describing what is necessary to repair that component for the specified. This information includes:
• A listing and sequence of repair steps.
• Type and number of personnel required to complete the repair steps.
• Time required to complete each repair step.
• Replacement parts needed for the repair. The modeler has the option to use default repair values or to specify different, customized repair information specific to a particular system. After scenario damage is specified, the modeler specifies system constraints for personnel and equipment. The model includes multiple types of resource personnel. Each category of personnel is assumed to be capable of performing only a specified set of repair tasks for which they are trained. The module includes default values for hourly labor rates and the number of personnel available in each personnel category. Also, the model includes the number of repair parts kept in storage, the cost for each part, and the time it takes for a new part to arrive after one is ordered. The module includes default values for personnel and part categories. The modeler has the option to use default values or to specify different, customized values specific to a particular system. The final step in system description module is specification of load priorities. The modeler has the option to prioritize loads connected to the bulk power system. Lowest priority loads will be shed first; highest priority loads will be shed last. If the modeler does not specify a priority, loads are shed equally.
After system parameters are specified in the system description module, the sequencing module compares personnel and parts needs for tasks to the constraints. The module loops through all of the components, from highest to lowest priority. If enough parts and personnel exist to perform repair tasks for the highest priority component, those repair personnel are removed from the pool of available personnel until the task is completed. The parts used in the repair task are permanently removed from the available parts pool. The module then moves to the next highest priority component. If available resources meet task requirements, those resources are similarly removed. If sufficient resources are not available, the module moves onto the next highest priority and repeats the comparison for the remaining components. A component is assumed to be fully restored and available for reenergizing when all of its repair tasks are completed.
It should be noted that components will not necessarily be repaired according to priority. If resources are not available to repair a component, a lower priority component may be repaired in the meantime if it requires fewer resources and those resources are available. This approach is viewed as being more efficient than halting all repair activities while waiting for resources to become available for the higher priority component.
It should also be noted that when parts inventories reach 50% of their original value, additional parts are ordered to restore the inventory to its original level. Replenishment of inventory is not instantaneous; shipping times are included in the module.
After going through the task-constraint comparison process, the sequencing module creates a set of component-repair time pairs. The completion of a repair results in a new damage state. For each successive damage state, a PowerWorld simulation is performed to calculate power flows across the network for that given state. The process is repeated for each damage state, and the sequence of simulations can be strung together to describe the dynamic restoration of network flows.
The results module reports statistics associated with the recovery process (Table I ). They include:
• Repair time for complete system restoration and individual components; • The costs of repair personnel and parts;
• Power provided to each connected load from the moment of disruption until complete system restoration. These statistics provide an assessment of the overall resilience of the resilience of the bulk power system to the disruption scenario.
B. A Mission Hierarchy Model
Developing a mission hierarchy model to draw on the results module of the bulk power system model is a multi-stage process. The first step involves interaction with mission stakeholders to define a conceptual model of the mission in the most abstract sense. This conceptual model is used to identify missions, their subordinate tasks, and the assets (usually locations) where task functionality is performed. Asset functionality is then tied to infrastructure requirements, principally for electric power, as well as requirements for manpower, materiel, and equipment (M/M/E) and task and mission requirements are identified to provide metrics of performance necessary for their successful completion, against which disruption so the availability of electric power can be modeled. Mission models can, in turn, be connected to war plans and other higher-level functions, enabling an enterpriselevel perspective on the performance of DoD and its elements. Figure 1 highlights this structure.
Existing CAPs are requested in each case and utilized where available in the conceptual model phase, for purposes of identifying existing contingency elements, either in terms of identifying redundant assets which can execute the mission should the primary asset be impacted, or (typically) identifying redundant supplies of infrastructure resources (e.g., electric power via UPS or backup generator, and fuel sources for backup generators) should primary sources be disrupted. The extent of coverage of redundancy is also identified in this phase of the effort -presence of a backup generator or UPS in support of a building does not necessarily mean the UPS or backup generator is designed to support all functionality of the building. In addition, previous disruptions are documented where possible, to identify courses of action taken, and lessons leaned from either exercising standing CAPs or putting them into action for real-world incidents.
Once these interactions are complete, a conceptual mission model is prepared and vetted past the same set of mission stakeholders to verify the conceptual model's validity, to correct errors, and to clarify uncertainties. This is particularly important to proper definition of mission metrics and the duration of backup resource availability. It is also valuable in assuring the proper connectivity (or lack thereof) between missions, or between tasks under a given mission (where behaviors similar to those seen in supply chains can exist and should be properly represented.
A well-defined conceptual model can then be converted into a computational model for execution. Here, Sandia researchers draw on an existing capability, the System of Systems Analysis Toolset (SoSAT), comprised of a suite of software tools -a State Model tool, a stochastic simulation tool, and advanced visualization tools -that have been used extensively to evaluate mission performance of military systems of systems across multiple functions and measures of effectiveness. SoSAT has been applied for a range of DoD and military services problems. The ability of SoSAT to address a range of scales in examining the same problem -from individual components to the composite of those elements in satisfaction of a mission -made it a natural fit for addressing the computational element of the mission hierarchy model.
In SoSAT, systems are comprised of primary elements, consumables, and human elements. For the mission computational model, primary elements would include buildings housing elements of a mission, reserve elements such as UPS and backup generators, and components or subcomponents deemed relevant to model within the context of the defined conceptual model. Consumables can be any commodity used by the system during its operation. For the computational model, this would include power, as well as fuel for backup generators. Human elements represent system personnel directly affecting the functionality of a system. For the computational model, this would include personnel assigned to resupply backup generator fuel stores from defined storage locations.
SoSAT then uses these system elements to define system functions. These are Boolean structures designed to identify the functional availability of a system, given the availability of its subcomponents. SoSAT can also represent partial functionality, which is valuable for the mission computational model. At each time step in a SoSAT model simulation, each system function is evaluated. Failed components may be repaired and brought back on-line, while operational components, lacking sufficient resources, may fail. Resource inventories (for spare parts and consumables) can also be tracked, with reorder strategies being examined. The failure of system components drives requirements for repair, with delays possible due to the lack of availability of resources, as well as delays due to assumed or projected repair time. For each element defined in the computational model, resource requirements can be defined, allowing for connectivity as expressed within the conceptual model. Duration of the availability of backup generation, the likelihood of a generator failing on initiation, and other metrics can be associated with each element.
Disruptions to the electric grid, as posited in the bulk power system model, can be used to define external conditions on the model. Thus, a disruptive effect on power can be introduced as the occurrence of a shortfall of electric power for certain facilities within the computational model, either as a fixed value or, preferably, as a probabilistic distribution. This allows for examination of the ability of the energy-demanding system to perform its many functionalities, and in turn, the overall mission or set of missions, given the loss of power projected by the electric power model.
C. Model Integration
The electric power resilience and mission hierarchy models can be used independently or separately. When used in combination, the initial disruptive event is represented in electric power resilience model. This model's output describes how electric power delivery is initially compromised and eventually restored to connected loads after the event. If one of the loads is assumed to be a military facility, the power model describes the magnitude and duration of the power outage for that facility. Hence, this outage information can be used as an input into the mission hierarchy model. With that information, the mission hierarchy model can, in turn, estimate the likelihood of mission impacts resulting from the initial disruption to the bulk power system. IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS This paper describes recent research efforts to develop a mission resilience modeling capability. Three requirements are put forth for mission resilience modeling efforts: 1) Mission resilience models consider dependencies on civilian infrastructure systems. 2) Mission resilience models must consider and characterize mission connectivity and dependencies. 3) Mission resilience models must consider dynamic recovery processes:
Researchers at Sandia have developed a set of models to characterize mission resilience to electric power outages. The first model simulates a disruptive event's impact on an electric power utility and the ensuing recovery activities that the utility takes to restore power. This model directly addresses requirements 1 and 3. A second model uses the output from the first model to define a power outage scenario and to predict how the outage could affect mission execution at facilities within and outside of the power outage region. This prediction is performed by identifying mission dependencies on power and mission interdependencies. In doing so, this model directly addresses requirements 2 and 3.
Future work includes further development of numerical models that implement the conceptual models. Preliminary software has been developed, but numerical experimentation, testing, and validation activities need to continue to further mature the software.
Though initial research efforts have focused on electric power disruptions and military consumers, the models are extensible to other types of infrastructure systems and to nonmilitary consumers. Ideally, one would develop a model that included multiple infrastructure dependencies (e.g., gas, water, power, telecommunications, etc.) for a single system. Disruptions to multiple types of infrastructure systems could be simulated, as well. The result of such an effort could enable an "all-hazards" infrastructure resilience assessment capability.
